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Abstract: For more than thirty years critical research in information systems (IS) has 
challenged the assumption that technology innovation is inherently desirable 
and hence to the benefit of all. Nevertheless, how researchers view the 
nature of being critical has changed over time, and so too have the ways that 
they pursue their critical agenda and argue for their contributions. In this 
paper I present a brief historical account of critical IS research, tracing the 
theoretical perspectives that have been dominant at different times and the 
empirical efforts that were guided by them. As part of tracing our current 
position I examine two key texts, authored by Chrisanthi Avgerou and Geoff 
Walsham, who pursue different types of critical agenda and make distinctive 
empirically-based contributions concerning the substantive issue of global 
diversity in IS innovation and its consequences. Overall, I suggest that the IS 
field now accepts broad definitions of the nature of being critical, but despite 
having a body of empirical critical research from which to learn, we are not 
making the most of our opportunities to do so, which retards further 
development. While I do not seek to develop a prescription for conducting 
and evaluating critical research, or try to encourage lengthy confessional 
accounts of research conduct in all journal papers, I do argue that we need 
more explicit reflections about our sustained long-term efforts in the field. 
Such reflections might consider the way we develop our critical arguments 
and insights, and what we strive for and accomplish through our 
interventions. In effect, the IS field has not yet reached a position where the 
theory and practice of doing critical research are informing each other. 
Keywords: critical research methods, information systems, critical social theory, 
research practice, longitudinal case studies, ethnography. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
A growing number of information systems (IS) researchers lay claims to adopting a 
critical perspective. They state this on their web pages, gather at conferences dedicated 
to critical research, and publish work where their declared aim is to challenge dominant 
discourses. But what do they really mean by “being critical”, how do they conduct this 
type of research, and in what ways might we evaluate its contribution? 
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These are key epistemological and methodological questions for any research 
perspective and, unsurprisingly, the answers that researchers in information systems 
have offered to them have changed over time. Specifically, IS researchers have declared 
what they mean by a critical perspective (Orlikowski and Baroudi, 1991; Walsham, 
2003), identified particular critical theories and concepts as promising ones for the 
discipline (Lyytinen, 1992; Avgerou, 2002), and argued that although there are no 
critical methods as such, interpretive methods can help in the field (University of 
Salford, 2001). Nevertheless, despite numerous calls since the 1970s for research that 
adopts a critical, reflexive stance on the interrelationships among information systems, 
organizations and society (Mumford and Sackman, 1974; Mumford et al, 1985; Nissen 
et al, 1991; Lyytinen, 1992; Lee et al, 1997; Adam et al, 2001; Walsham, 2003), the 
existing contributions are mostly conceptual. Moreover, even within the relatively small 
body of empirical work that has been conducted, researchers are noticeably silent about 
their contributions to critical research methods, so this work does not seem to be 
informing our research practices. 
We might conclude that much empirical critical research is undertaken by engaging 
with critical theories and qualitative, hermeneutic (or interpretive) methods. But there is 
an inherent tension in adopting such an approach. Research methods informed by an 
interpretive stance would look for multiple interpretations and deep understanding of 
the often conflicting rationalities of the actors involved in IS innovation. Critical 
researchers, on the other hand, often have a cause – for example, feminism, 
environmentalism, less developed economies – so they may see a particular conflict and 
focus on that, downplaying other potential interpretations. With these considerations in 
mind, we may explore the relationship between critical and interpretive research, 
specifically in light of changing definitions about the nature of “being critical”. We may 
then ask: how much have we learnt about engaging in critical research, what seem to be 
the prevailing practices and unresolved issues, and in what ways might further 
development of critical IS research take place? Overall, I argue that we have made a 
significant effort conceptualizing critical research, a lesser effort practising critical 
research, and virtually no effort reflecting upon the conduct of critical research. In 
effect, the IS field has not yet reached a position where the theory and practice of doing 
critical research are informing each other. 
Following this introductory section, I discuss some key ideas and publications that 
have provided an ideological and theoretical basis for critical research on the 
interrelationships among information systems, organizations and society. Adopting an 
inclusive view of the nature of being critical, I examine some resources and guidance 
available to those who engage in critical research. Then I discuss two key texts that 
demonstrate different ways of pursuing a critical agenda, and ask what research practice 
can learn from them. I conclude with some implications for researchers doing empirical 
critical work. 
2 THE CHANGING NATURE OF BEING CRITICAL 
In the late 1980s, Smircich and Calas argued that the organizational culture literature 
„has become dominant but dead‟, and asked „what of the opposition – is it in vain?‟ 
(1987, p. 248). They suggested that a „cultured organizational literature‟ – as 
postmodernist criticism – is how we should understand the way that organizational 
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theorizing had been transformed. In essence, their argument was that the interpretivist 
movement in organizational culture research, which earlier had presented a substantive 
challenge to mainstream organizational theory, had now been absorbed into the 
dominant managerialist discourse. Nevertheless, they suggested that the opposition 
movement had paved the way for those who had been excited by it to adopt a more 
critical, reflexive stance within the discipline. One might ask at this point if interpretive 
researchers in information systems began to sense something similar at much the same 
time. Many IS researchers who now claim to conduct critical research would have 
emphasized their interpretive stance ten or fifteen years ago. Has interpretive research in 
information systems now been subsumed within a managerialist discourse or has the 
definition of critical research broadened to include interpretive work? In the following 
paragraphs I suggest that we can see shifts in both directions in the changes that have 
taken place. 
2.1 A social democratic view 
In the introduction to their forthcoming edited volume (Avgerou et al, 2004), 
Chrisanthi Avgerou, Claudio Ciborra and Frank Land discuss the seminal contribution 
made to a critical discourse within information systems by the proceedings of the 
Human Choice and Computers conference of 1974. In these proceedings the editors, 
Mumford and Sackman (1974), encouraged people in all walks of life to engage with 
the way that computer applications were being developed and deployed, and to make 
the human choices necessary to ensure that democratic values and ideals were preserved 
for the benefit of everyone. In such a social democratic perspective, there was a belief 
that humans could take deliberate action to maintain their cherished values by having 
these ideals incorporated into the design of computer systems. Moreover, there was a 
belief that social scientists could actively support such an endeavour because they were 
able to make a „logical and objective assessment of the computer environment and its 
impact on human beings‟ (ibid. p. 325-326). Such beliefs are consistent with the socio-
technical approach, pioneered by members of the Tavistock Institute in London, and 
developed and modified by Mumford and colleagues in the UK (Mumford and Weir, 
1979) and several researchers in Scandinavian countries (Hedberg, 1980; Kyng and 
Mathiassen, 1982; Ehn and Sandberg, 1983). 
In contrast to critical orientations that were to emerge later on, Mumford and 
Sackman were significantly concerned with preserving the status quo, at least in terms 
of how they perceived it to exist within a democratic industrial society: specifically, 
they sought improvements in the quality of working life, rather than a transformation of 
society. Nevertheless, they were alert to the conflicting interests that would attend such 
an effort, to the extent that their view of criticality rested in urging social scientists to 
engage actively with the trades unions so that workers would have a key mediating role 
on the process of technological change. In later years, weaknesses in the socio-technical 
position started to emerge. Surplus labour, the rise of global capitalism, and moves – 
including legislation in some countries – to curb the influence of the trades unions 
meant that the socio-technical design approach was increasingly abandoned (Kyng, 
1998; Mumford, 1999, 2000). But being unprepared for a harsher commercial climate 
was only one of its weaknesses: the idealistic pursuit of logical, objective knowledge 
left it open to being subsumed within a managerialist discourse, but also ill placed to 
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grasp the opportunities for influencing the course of IS innovation during use as well as 
during design (Avgerou, 2002). 
2.2 An emancipatory view 
Revealing a belief in consensus decision making and a concern with democratization 
of the workplace and society, an emancipatory view of criticality shares some 
similarities with a socio-technical approach. However, there are also major differences: 
specifically, the emancipatory tradition is openly critical of the status quo, seeing the 
need to transform society to achieve a „better‟ life for all, and is sensitized to the way 
that structural forces – again, largely as perceived in Western industrial societies – 
mediate the transformation efforts. 
The emancipatory view emanated from the Institute of Social Research in Frankfurt, 
but has been specifically associated with the work of Jurgen Habermas, whose approach 
may be differentiated from theoretical positions adopted by other prominent members of 
the Frankfurt School, including Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse. Overall, these 
scholars sought to develop a historically grounded social theory that could be used to 
practical effect in real world situations. They sought to free human subjects from 
oppressive regimes within societies and within the institutions that constitute them. 
They believed that conscious human action could bring about the required changes, 
albeit in a situation mediated by institutional, historical and market forces. Habermas‟ 
approach to the critical project is characterized by a concern with linguistic and 
hermeneutic issues, and therefore with the role of language in societal development, 
rather than with a critique per se of western industrial life, its consumerist logic or 
instrumental reason (Laughlin, 1987). Unlike his contemporaries in the Frankfurt 
School, Habermas does not compare society to a predefined ideal state, from which it is 
judged to fall far short. Rather he tries to define the ideal conditions in which such an 
evaluation may take place. Moreover, Habermas provides considerable detail about the 
requisite conditions for ideal speech, and in this way his methodological approach is 
more comprehensive than the generalized critiques of Western society provided by his 
colleagues. 
Laughlin (ibid.) argued that these features of Habermas‟ work provided a promising 
vehicle for critical accounting research. Similarly, critical research in information 
systems during the 1980s emphasized the insights that could be gained from a 
Habermasian perspective (see, for example, Lyytinen and Klein, 1985; Lyytinen and 
Hirschheim, 1988; Ngwenyama, 1991). Nevertheless, the research that followed seemed 
to acknowledge the weaknesses of an approach that seeks to remove the distorters of 
communication without having adequate mechanisms to analyse the power relations 
that gave rise to them in the first place (Lyytinen, 1992; Flyvbjerg, 1998). This work 
called for complementarism in critical research, by incorporating ideas from Foucault 
and Giddens alongside a Habermasian perspective (see also Mingers, 1992). 
Others have argued that while critique of the status quo is highly appropriate, the 
emancipatory enterprise was a product of space and time. The optimistic, some would 
say utopian, nature of these narratives and their “totalizing” tendencies (Alvesson and 
Willmott, 1992) may be understood as a response to a Nazi regime, from which 
members of the Frankfurt School fled into exile in the United States in the mid-1930s 
(Burrell, 1994). In a transformed but still divided world, eclectic views of criticality 
seem better able to address the key role of context in framing what is considered 
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rational and desirable (Avgerou and Madon, 2004) and to account for the grossly 
uneven processes of IS innovation in a global context (Walsham, 2001; Avgerou, 2002). 
2.3 Towards an eclectic view 
Some measure of the diverse views of criticality that now have currency are given by 
the following citations. Alvesson and Deetz (2000) identify three concerns of the critical 
researcher – insight arising from hermeneutic understanding, critique produced through 
genealogy and deconstruction, and transformative redefinition to open up new ways of 
engaging the social world. They argue: 
 
Critical research may have different emphases; interpretive work aiming for insight may 
be central, complemented by limited elements of critique and transformative re-
definitions. Critique may also dominate, but if so the empirical case study is typically 
used for more limited, illustrative purposes. Transformative redefinition should not 
dominate empirical research. Texts dominated by this tend to be Utopian and this quality 
is not salient in studies with research ambitions (p. 153). 
 
This description suggests a broad definition of critical work, in which the role of 
achieving transformative or emancipatory effects is not our only or even our most 
immediate goal. It incorporates the Habermasian position that has been so popular in IS 
and related disciplines (for example, Lyytinen and Klein, 1985; Laughlin, 1987; 
Lyytinen, 1992; Mingers, 1992; Hirschheim and Klein, 1994), but it also includes a 
number of other positions, including the view that interpretive work may be critical. 
Along similarly inclusive lines, Walsham (2003) cites from Saren and Brownlie 
(1999) to argue for a broad definition of critical IS research and of the type of theories 
that might be brought to bear in critical studies: 
 
By critical perspectives we mean modes of theorising and research practices which regard 
knowledge and its related technologies as socially constructed and enacted; which take 
those practices to be historically and culturally contingent; and which are understood to 
shape and be shaped by vested interests and power. 
 
By critical theory we mean any approach drawing inspiration from the substantive critical 
traditions of, for example, feminism, Marxism, ethnography and symbolism, post-
structuralism, hermeneutics, postmodernism and environmentalism. 
 
In the above definition of critical perspectives we see social constructionist concerns 
– the focus of interpretive research (Walsham, 1993) – alongside issues of historical and 
cultural contingency and power relations – a major concern for critical researchers 
(Orlikowski and Baroudi, 1991). In the definition of critical theory we see a number of 
approaches where the critical agenda is overt; others where the argument would be that 
which voices are lost is situational; and some where the emphasis might be on gaining 
interpretive understanding. Moreover, Walsham (2003) made his address to a culturally 
diverse audience – a joint meeting of Working Groups 8.2 and 9.4 of the International 
Federation of Information Processing (IFIP) – so his discussion of the ideas of Mahatma 
Gandhi and Nelson Mandela was apposite. Indeed, he accepted a view from the 
audience suggesting that some critical researchers might find these ideas more useful in 
their work than the predominantly Western inspired perspectives cited above. 
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Clearly, how we view the nature of being critical has changed over time. While 
advocates of a social democratic view of criticality sought to achieve their effects through 
action research interventions in the process of technology innovation, proponents of an 
emancipatory view focused on developing a theoretical position for the IS discipline. In 
effect, the socio-technical approach sought to validate its concepts and ideas through 
practice (Mumford, 2000), while the emancipatory effort was (as others have argued 
about the works of Habermas) speculative until empirically tested (Burrell, 1994)
1
. 
Most notably, in the context of this paper, there is little scope in most emancipatory 
writings for learning about the practice of doing critical research. More recently, the 
body of empirical critical work has increased; its authors are less inclined to argue that 
there is a universally desirable state of affairs, and in turn the research draws upon a 
more diverse range of theoretical resources. Nevertheless, this effort to acknowledge 
diversity in critical research is not matched by an interest in abstracting from its practice 
to inform our research methods. In effect, we have put much effort into defining the 
nature of being critical, but largely ignored opportunities for learning how criticality is 
achieved. 
3 ON ACHIEVING CRITICALITY 
At this point it is appropriate to ask what resources and guidance are available to 
those who wish to engage in critical research. What do we know already about linking 
theory and research practice through method in pursuit of a critical agenda, and what are 
the key unresolved issues? 
In the last section I showed how prevailing views of criticality incorporate the 
position that interpretive work may be critical. Throughout the 1990s, the IS discipline 
produced a body of interpretive work. Moreover, IS and organizational researchers have 
drawn from empirical work to reflect on research practice in a number of writings about 
interpretive research methods (for example, Golden-Biddle and Locke, 1993; Walsham, 
1993, 1995; Klein and Myers, 1999). Still, interpretive work is no more than an 
interpretation unless it has a limited critique. More controversially, perhaps, I suggest 
that critical work may be „less than‟ interpretive. Finally, I suggest that these issues are 
not purely epistemological. 
For example, Orlikowski‟s (1996) study of organizational transformation is a much 
cited example of interpretive work aiming to show how a group of customer service 
staff experimented with Lotus Notes in an incremental and improvisational process that 
gave rise to innovation and learning within the organization. Yet one may argue that the 
result of this emergent change was to produce a work process that was increasingly 
control oriented in a Foucauldian sense (cf. Lin and Cornford, 2000). Orlikowski 
addresses the interpretive concerns of understanding human agency as embedded in 
social context and viewing knowledge as a social construction (Walsham, 1993), but 
she does not problematize what was driving the transformation effort (Avgerou and 
McGrath, forthcoming). One form of a limited critique would question whether an 
outcome increasing managerial control was desirable to all. In effect it would challenge 
                                                 
1 In 1992, Lyytinen concluded that IS research had made modest progress in applying a critical 
perspective based on the works of Habermas. He called for more empirical studies, but this work (for 
example, Ngwenyama and Lee, 1997; Myers and Young, 1997, Cecez-Kecmanovic, 2001) has been slow 
to materialize. 
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Orlikowski‟s assumption that, whatever their tactics, actors constructed reality in terms 
of an overall goal of achieving organizational effectiveness, hence economic success of 
the firm (ibid.). 
How actors are constituted, historically and culturally, may provide key questions for 
interpretive researchers with critical intent, but when such questions have a very 
focused structuralist effect on a critical agenda they may limit interpretation to the 
extent that it is unconvincing. For example, Hofmann (1999) argues that word 
processing software of the late 1970s and early 1980s was based on an image of the user 
that shows gender bias. Yet the design features to which she objects (for example, 
several levels of menu imposing rigid structure on female secretaries) were pervasive 
features of most commercial applications of the period (McGrath, 2003), including the 
investment banking and insurance underwriting applications used by predominantly 
male managers in London‟s financial institutions. Hofmann‟s feminist agenda fails to 
take account of the naïve way that systems developers of the time constituted the 
capabilities of „users‟ – without regard to the user‟s gender or status – nor does it 
address how the limitations of hardware and software affected the design of commercial 
systems. 
Of course, the above arguments support the position that „[t]heory is both a way of 
seeing and a way of not-seeing‟ (Walsham, 1993, p. 6), but they are also a way of 
introducing the notion that theory and practice need to inform each other (ibid., p. 7), in 
this case with regard to the conduct of critical research. Two readings are important in 
showing that the issues raised are methodological as well as epistemological. 
First, Klein and Myers (1999) describe seven interdependent principles for 
conducting and evaluating interpretive field studies in information systems. In the 
interpretive studies they examined, they found a strong theoretical basis (principle four), 
which prompted researchers to take account of historical and cultural context (principle 
two), and to search for multiple interpretations (principle six) while being suspicious of 
all of them (principle seven). Nevertheless, they also found that the way researchers 
came to decide upon the theoretical concepts that would inform their work (principle 
five), and how researchers and research subjects were constituted and transformed in 
their interactions during the research (principle three) are poorly addressed. Overall, 
they suggest that these studies – considered exemplars of interpretive field research in 
information systems (ibid. p. 84) – give at most moderate attention to the overarching 
concern of interaction between the totality and the parts (principle one). What Klein and 
Myers are addressing is a process in which the search for meaning must at some time 
confront the need to decide upon a theoretical perspective from which to attempt a 
coherent account – a point at which hermeneutics faces structuralism and the researcher 
must decide how to respond. 
Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982) argue that Foucault addressed this issue by going 
„beyond structuralism and hermeneutics‟. In essence, they suggest that Foucault‟s work 
shows that he was aware of how he and his subjects were constituted by it, but also that 
he was able to achieve some distance from what he found in order to make a pragmatic 
reading. In other words, Foucault made an interpretation without being driven by the 
hermeneutic search for deep meaning, but also produced critique without appealing to 
an essential theory of human nature, or invoking general formulae or universal 
categories for analysis. Whether one accepts that Foucault achieved such a pragmatic 
project is not our question here. Rather I argue that dealing with a combination of 
hermeneutic and structuralist issues is an important and non-trivial task for critical 
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researchers, in which I include interpretive researchers with critical intent. Moreover, I 
focus on longitudinal studies and ethnographies, not only because these tend to be 
critical researchers‟ methods of choice (Orlikowski and Baroudi, 1991), but also 
because they are a way of conducting interpretive research (Klein and Myers, 1999) 
which may produce elements of critique. 
The methodological issues, then, are not the rather straightforward matters of 
whether to do interviews, observation, or both; with whom; and for how long: these 
details are not unimportant, but documenting them alone does no more than conform to 
the static positivist model that critical researchers claim to reject. The issues for critical 
research are those concerned with how research conduct is a response to the unfolding 
pattern of research findings; the way that researchers and their subjects are changed in 
the process; and how researchers achieve critical distance. The first two issues are those 
that Klein and Myers (1999) found to be largely ignored in the interpretive studies they 
examined. Moreover, they argue that in the study they found to have the most critical 
orientation greater attention was given to contextualizing the research – historically and 
culturally – and to exercising suspicion of all narratives. While such contextualization 
and suspicion may be seen as defining traits of a critical researcher, I suggest that at 
some point a critical researcher must break out of the hermeneutics of suspicion to 
problematize the observed behaviours. In the Foucauldian spirit suggested by Dreyfus 
and Rabinow (1982), they must find a way to present an account that neither relies 
solely on what the research subjects say, nor expects to unearth „a different and deeper 
meaning of which the social actors are only dimly aware‟ (p. xx). 
In short, Klein and Myers principles are useful for critical as well as interpretive 
research, but where critique is a goal some principles will likely be emphasized more 
than others, and researchers must be prepared to abandon the hermeneutic search for 
deep meaning. Without claiming that critical researchers give insufficient thought to 
their research conduct, I argue that their accounts of research methodology show limited 
evidence of it. I suggest that they must, so that critical researchers can not only reject 
the positivist model, but also establish their credentials in a methodological sense, and 
reach a position where the theory and practice of critical research inform each other. 
4 TWO EXAMPLES OF CRITICAL RESEARCH 
In this section I examine two key texts in which the authors subscribe to a critical 
agenda, so that I may ask what research practice can learn from them. The texts I have 
chosen are Making a World of Difference: IT in a Global Context (Walsham, 2001) and 
Information Systems and Global Diversity (Avgerou, 2002) for the following reasons. 
First, the authors explicitly claim to have a critical agenda, but they pursue it in different 
ways. Second, these books have been widely acclaimed within the IS community, and 
by scholars in other disciplines: reviews suggest that they provide insight and critique 
on the adoption and use of information and communication technologies (ICTs) in a 
global context (Boland and Hirschheim, 2001; Ramiller, 2003; Sahay, 2003). Third, the 
books have a substantive empirical content, with some supporting details of the authors‟ 
research methodologies. I examine both texts by reference to the ideas outlined in 
previous sections. 
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4.1 The nature of being critical 
Broadly speaking, both Walsham (2001) and Avgerou (2002) adopt a critical 
perspective to examine the processes of ICT innovation and organizational change in a 
global context, but a key difference is the combination of insight and critique sought by 
the authors (Alvesson and Deetz, 2000). Walsham develops in-depth field studies to 
raise awareness of our differences, and to appeal to us to celebrate them. The search for 
insight is central, but it is complemented by a critique arguing that there are aspects of a 
multicultural world that are unacceptable, such as the stark asymmetries of wealth and 
power among different groups. Walsham aspires to some transformation – making a 
better world with IT – and he challenges us to engage with this effort, primarily because 
he believes we should be morally concerned, but also because globalization has 
consequences for all of us, so doing nothing is not an option. 
Avgerou uses case studies to illustrate a critique addressing the marginalization of 
diverse interests in the unfolding of ICT innovation and organizational change in a 
global context. Critique is central to her effort to bring to consciousness the restrictive 
conditions of the current socio-economic order, but it is supported by four case studies 
that highlight the need for a context-specific analysis of how those conditions come to 
bear on a particular innovation effort. Avgerou lays claim to a pragmatic position, in 
which she evaluates IS innovation in terms of its practical consequences in a particular 
context. In this way, she eschews proposing a particular quality of social order, but 
challenges us to reexamine our assumptions with the claim that none of democracy, 
emancipation or economic development is universally desirable. 
4.2 Achieving criticality 
Walsham and Avgerou have a strong theoretical basis to their work (Klein and 
Myers, 1999, principle four), but neither appeals to an essential theory of nature or 
society. Rather their use of theory is eclectic, intended to reflect the diversity of 
contexts they studied and the uneven way in which IS innovation has unfolded in a 
global context. Both authors contextualize their research (ibid. principle two), pay 
attention to multiple viewpoints (ibid. principle six), but make their own sense of them 
(ibid. principle seven), asserting that in the final analysis the interpretation is their own. 
Nevertheless, the emphasis they give to the particular principles of the hermeneutic 
process highlighted above varies in each case. 
Walsham makes a very eclectic use of concepts, guided by his concern to examine 
issues at individual, group, organizational, interorganizational and societal levels. He 
uses extensive commentary from his research subjects to support arguments that are 
none the less his own because he has selected which commentaries to include and the 
theoretical concepts through which they will be presented. His emphasis is on showing 
the multiple viewpoints, and the range of ideas that can be used to understand them, 
supported by a strong assertion in his methodology section that his is an – and not the – 
interpretation. This approach gives a rich picture of life at individual, group and 
organizational levels, but less detail about the socio-economic and political conditions 
in which that life is embedded. 
Avgerou emphasizes how the IS innovation processes she describes were shaped 
historically and culturally. Strongly, but not solely, influenced by institutionalist theory, 
she examines in some detail the socio-political and economic conditions in which the 
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innovations took place and how those conditions were constituted over many years. Her 
methodology appendix states that she interviewed her research subjects, but she makes 
no use of commentary from them, seeking to convince us of her claim that these 
innovation efforts were intensely negotiated through her detailed descriptions of 
historical and cultural context. This approach provides a rich picture of life in terms of 
organizational, national and, to some extent, cross-national layers of analysis, without 
making use of „talking subjects‟ to comment on how the conflicts arising came to bear 
on them personally. 
In terms of the four principles examined so far, Walsham makes strong links between 
theory and multiple interpretations, while Avgerou emphasizes the relationship between 
theory and historical and cultural context. From the case descriptions, as well as the 
authors‟ own claims to making an interpretation, it is clear that neither Walsham nor 
Avgerou took the commentaries of their research subjects at face value. What, then, do 
they say about how they broke out of the hermeneutics of suspicion to decide upon the 
theoretical concepts that would inform their work (principle five), and how they and 
their research subjects were constituted and transformed in their interactions during the 
research (principle three)? On these issues, the authors‟ descriptions of their research 
methodology are short on detail, but again in different ways. 
Walsham states that his methods were informed by an interpretive stance, a subject 
on which he has already contributed (Walsham, 1993, 1995), but he includes Making a 
World of Difference within a broad definition of critical research (Walsham, 2003). 
How, then, should we understand the way that an interpretive stance can ultimately give 
rise to critical research? If we accept Walsham‟s claim that his field studies were 
conducted using interpretive methods, and for the most part this is the way he reports on 
them in his journal papers, then how did he achieve criticality in his book? 
I suggest that when writing the book he engaged in a problematization of what was 
driving these IS innovation efforts, so as to consider the diverse ways in which 
globalization has consequences for everyone. The work involved to do this was no 
mechanistic „cut and paste job‟ from his journal papers, but it was part of his research 
methodology for the book. It also involved examining field studies in which he did not 
participate, and in these cases he says that he sought comments from other authors, and 
sometimes modified his interpretation of their research in response to replies received. 
His motivations for doing this work are made clear in the book‟s Preface, but it would 
be instructive to know more about the effort involved to reconsider a decade of research 
and present it with critical intent, and how he and his collaborators were changed in the 
process. If research methodology is a cause that deserves our attention, and Walsham‟s 
publication record suggests that he finds it so, then critical research would surely benefit 
from such an undertaking. 
Avgerou, on the other hand, makes no direct appeals in her methodology appendix to 
the assumptions of a particular research philosophy, but elsewhere in her book she lays 
claim to a critical perspective. Still, her methodology section resembles the static 
accounts of research conduct we might expect to find in the normative research she so 
explicitly rejects throughout the main body of her book. The format of this section and 
its relegation to an appendix not only runs counter to the considered way she presents 
the epistemological foundations of her work, but also contradicts the structurationist 
approach she adopts elsewhere by giving the impression that she believes epistemology 
and methodology are separable. 
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One needs to look elsewhere to discover more about Avgerou‟s methodological 
effort. In the Preface to her book, she describes how her doctoral students, who were 
sometimes more familiar than her with the cultural context of particular cases, 
challenged her views and influenced her interpretations. She also shows how students 
participating in her graduate seminars on „IT in Developing Countries‟ informed her 
effort over many years. When one compares how she reported on some of the cases in 
her journal papers (Avgerou, 2000, 2001), we see that they are transformed in the book, 
with considerably more attention to the socio-political and economic conditions of 
particular nations. In the book chapters, Avgerou‟s style seems to owe much to the 
„strong textualist‟ approach of Foucault (Rorty, 1982, cited in Golden-Biddle and 
Locke, 1993), in which descriptions of the historical and cultural contexts dominate. 
Her methodological approach also seems to be a Foucauldian-inspired effort to go 
„beyond structuralism and hermeneutics‟ (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982), in the manner 
described earlier. Avgerou might tell us more of this effort by abstracting from her own 
research conduct to inform research practice, rather than subscribing reluctantly to a 
normative model of documenting methodology in which she surely does not believe. 
Although following a positivist model for documenting research conduct may be an 
indication that authors are conforming to the normative pressures of a particular journal 
(Klein and Myers, 1999), these pressures are often less intense when writing a book. 
However, „[s]elf-reporting faces the twin dangers of over-modesty and self-
aggrandisement, and it is particularly difficult to steer a middle path between these two 
extremes‟ (Walsham, 1995, p. 78). This is perhaps why Walsham and Avgerou leave 
some details to our imagination when they document their research conduct, the more 
so because the type of reflexivity that characterizes critical research might make that 
reporting especially prone to such dangers. Nevertheless, established colleagues do not 
become so without facing these dangers in other aspects of their work: lessons they 
have learned along the way can surely only help those whose reputations are still in the 
making. 
5 DISCUSSION 
This research suggests that broad definitions of the nature of being critical have 
currency within the IS discipline, that the body of empirical critical work is increasing, 
but that we are not making the most of opportunities to learn from our efforts to date, 
which retards further development. These findings inform the way I seek to develop this 
research in three ways. First, broad definitions of critical perspectives suggest that, 
starting from a position that interpretive research may be critical, we might explore how 
to make more use of existing research models, and the potential they offer for guiding 
the conduct and evaluation of critical research. Such an effort at reuse has a precedent, 
as Walsham (1995) reminds us when he elaborates Eisenhardt‟s (1989) positivist model 
in his paper on the nature and method of interpretive research. Second, the broad 
definitions outlined earlier suggest that issues, as much as theories, are key to the nature 
of critical research. Ironically, positivism has a further lesson for us, since many 
positivist researchers would argue that it is their focus on issues that drives their 
research efforts and accords them relevance. Within critical research, however, we 
might strive for a combination of issues and theories that accepts several models for 
conducting and evaluating critical work, rather than trying to derive a uniform set of 
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guidelines that risks being too general to be helpful or too riven with contradiction to be 
useful. Third, since much conceptual critical work has now been undertaken within the 
IS discipline, and empirical critical work is on the increase, we have an opportunity to 
evaluate what we have learned so far and suggest further developments. 
The two books I have examined in this paper adopt different ways of pursuing a 
critical agenda. Both authors‟ critical issue is the uneven way in which IS innovation 
unfolds in a global context, and each is particularly concerned with the consequences 
for less developed economies. Walsham draws from a very broad range of social 
theories, although Giddens‟ influence is a continuing theme. Avgerou is influenced by 
Foucault, arguably more strongly than her rather short discussion of his work would 
suggest. In terms of the emphases in their work (Alvesson and Deetz, 2000), Walsham 
focuses on achieving insight arising from hermeneutic understanding, whereas Avgerou 
directs her effort to producing critique. Walsham approaches his task by making strong 
links between theory and multiple interpretations (Klein and Myers, 1999, principles 
four and six), which gives a richer picture of life for individuals and groups than it 
achieves at broader societal levels of analysis (ibid. principle two). Avgerou uses theory 
to present a detailed account of particular IS innovation efforts, in which descriptions of 
the historical, organizational and socio-economic contexts dominate (ibid. principles 
four and two). But, as with the „strong textualist‟ style of Foucault‟s work, she leaves us 
to speculate on what the subjects of these organizing regimes would say if she had 
included their commentaries (ibid. principle six). 
The authors‟ different emphases on insight and critique seem to account for the way 
they approach their work in an epistemological sense. Methodologically, however, we 
have to work harder to understand their achievements. I argue that Walsham and 
Avgerou provide some evidence of the efforts required to achieve their effects, but not 
enough detail to enable us to learn as much as we could from them. The authors 
document only partially the dynamics of the research process – how it was a response to 
the unfolding pattern of research findings; how they and their research subjects were 
changed in the process; and how critical distance was achieved (ibid. the relationship 
among principles three, five and seven). However, these are the aspects of critical 
research about which we know the least, not only because empirical work is lagging 
conceptual efforts, but also because we are not making the most of our opportunities to 
reflect on the field studies we undertake. 
As Smircich observed about the key questions for non-positivist researchers of 
organizational culture: the task is not to say „what is organizational culture?‟, with a 
view to prescribing how organizations can create a desirable one; rather it is to ask „how 
is organization accomplished, and what does it mean to be organized?‟ (1983, p. 353). 
In a similar manner, I argue that we have spent some time already asking „what is 
critical research?‟; we now need to shift attention to examine the examples we have, 
with a view to understanding how such research is accomplished and what it means to 
be critical. In this effort, we need to give as much attention to documenting our 
methodological approach as to explicating the epistemological foundations of our work. 
In summary, I do not try to develop a model for conducting and evaluating critical 
research. Rather, I take some answers we have provided to the question „what is critical 
research?‟ and explore what they mean for the nature and method of doing critical work. 
In this paper, I raise more questions than I alone can hope to answer, but perhaps that is 
not a bad model for an aspiring critical researcher. My message is one of appealing to 
colleagues not just to engage in more empirical work, but to use the opportunities it 
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provides to reflect on research conduct. In my concluding section I give some reasons 
why I think such an effort is important. 
6 CONCLUSION 
I have argued that the theory and practice of conducting critical IS research do not 
seem to be informing each other. Specifically, when critical researchers report on their 
field studies, their descriptions of methodology (where these are provided at all) show 
few, if any, distinguishing traits from those of interpretive or positivist researchers. Yet 
to produce a substantive critique, some additional or different research practices must 
take place. While these practices remain unstated or implicit, critical researchers will 
continue to identify few methodological contributions and critical methods will remain 
underdeveloped. Why does this matter? 
First, there are few examples of empirical critical research relative to either 
interpretive or normative studies. Although interpretivism has done much to challenge 
the dominant normative IS literature and practice, I suggest that deep understanding and 
rich description can only take us so far. Critical research, potentially at least, offers a 
promising approach for addressing some of the complex and thus far intractable issues 
we face today. Yet doctoral students, as one source of potential critical researchers, 
usually decide not to pursue a critical project, even when their supervisors conduct 
critical research. Supervisors may argue that this is because they give their students 
room to find their own approach, but might it not also be because their students can 
usually find more guidance in the literature on how to conduct an interpretive or 
normative project? Over time, are we reinforcing other approaches and keeping critical 
research on the sidelines simply because the latter is too difficult for us? 
Second, critical researchers may argue that reflecting upon (rather than just 
documenting) research methods is virtually absent in the dominant forms of research – 
notably the hypothetico-deductive approach – so why should they do more or subscribe 
to a normative regime in which they do not believe. How we criticize those “all-
knowing” researchers, who develop their theoretical frameworks up front and then seem 
to find no reason to reconsider them during empirical work. Can we really expect those 
who tell part of the story to take our criticism seriously if we say even less about our 
research conduct? And don‟t some of us sometimes publish rather indiscriminately, 
presenting the same study from a number of slightly differing perspectives, so that 
which reading said what tends to blur in our readers‟ minds even if they do not in our 
own recollection? Is it unthinkable that we might reconsider our publication strategies 
and take the time needed to reflect on research conduct, in the interest of publishing 
both good examples for colleagues starting out and work for which we would like to be 
remembered? 
Third, it is hardly news to argue that certain journals (seen by many as the „top‟ 
journals in our field) will not publish work that omits a detailed description of research 
methods. Walsham (2003) has already encouraged us to try to infiltrate outlets such as 
MIS Quarterly with critical studies. For those who would publish elsewhere rather than 
submit to what they perceive to be a normative regime, I have this appeal. Write an 
occasional paper on method for your journal of choice. I have no desire to encourage 
lengthy confessional accounts of research conduct in all journal papers – some of us 
would simply not say anything new. But if journals with a track record of publishing 
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critical work aspire to wider readership and higher rankings, can it harm their case if 
they can show that their contributors are sophisticated in a methodological sense? 
Finally, I said at the outset that critical researchers often have a cause. This paper 
would give us all another one – the cause of method – so that whatever else we hope to 
bring to consciousness we do it more convincingly. 
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